Saber Article Index
	2001 Jul-Aug
	MEDEVAC 15th Med\15th FSB  
Mike Bodnar 
	
307B N Main Copperas Cove, TX 76522 
1704 254-542-1961 
E-mail:
	mbodnar27@juno.com
	I was informed that long time MEDEVAC and 7th 
	Cav Medic Jim HALL is reported K.I.A. due to an auto accident. GARRYOWEN! 
	Jim, R.I.P. And thanks always, SO THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE.
	Dennis O'DONNELL DENNISODNL@AOL.COM from Denver, CO writes in and 
	says that he was assigned to 15th MED in April of '66 at An Khe. He says 
	that the orderly room had the words in bold letters over the door: 
	"Through These Doors Passed the Best Damn Medics in the World."
He 
	also says that he would love to locate a SFC Charles D. CLINTSMAN, whom 
	he says, "Was one hell of a soldier and medic. [He] Always cared more for 
	his men than himself. Felt it his duty to stay in Vietnam after his first 
	year, as he said, 'This is what I was 'trained' to do.' Best lifer I ever 
	met!!!"
Dan PORTER DANIELF@BIGPLANET.COM wrote in to say that he 
	served with HHC, 15th MED BN in 1969, Phouc Vinh and with CO C in Quan 
	Loi.
Jim BLACK HEADHUNTERS9@HOTMAIL.COM wrote again to say: "Hi 
	Mike, This is 'Blackie' again with a bit of info for you and your column. 
	I'm in touch with the American Legion Post in Jeffersontown, KY (a suburb 
	of Louisville) and they are dedicating a Veterans Memorial Park 27 May 
	01. The park features 2 AA guns, a tank, and a UH-1 H helicopter. There 
	seems to be something special about this helicopter (at least to me) that 
	might interest you and your readers. Though this bird has received a new 
	coat of paint, I was told that this bird had a MEDEVAC emblem painted on 
	both sliding doors and a CAV patch painted on the vertical tail when the 
	bird arrived to be painted. I have been able to obtain this bird's serial 
	#, which is 68-16405. Since the repainting, this memorial piece only 
	sports a good sized CAV patch on its nose. Betty and I will be going to 
	the dedication and take some pics of the bird-which I will forward to you 
	for your column. Well gotta get moving. Take Care, First Team, Blackie 
	P.S.- So far nothing is happening with what you mentioned in your last 
	article for me."
Ric HOOVER RHOOVERJ@TAMPABAY.RR.COM from Largo, FL, 
	wrote in to say that he served with C Co 15 Med BN, 3 Bde 1 Air Cav 
	from Jan '66-Jan '67.
Dick SAUNDERS 
	RLSAUNDERS66@JUNO.COM from TX 
	says that he served with B Co 15th Med Bn from Jan 2, '68 until Dec 
	31, '68.
I got snail mail from Doug CAMPBELL who was a MEDEVAC crew 
	chief of aircraft #67-17624 from Oct '71 through Jan '72, out of FSB 
	Mace. Doug wrote in response to one of my columns, probably when I 
	mentioned that the 1st Cav put M-60s on MEDEVAC in Jan '66 and that they 
	stayed on, the only aeromedical evacuation unit in Vietnam to have fixed 
	armament.
Doug says that at the start of '72 they did remove their 
	60s. He refers to an article in the Jan '72 "Garryowen" about 
	supporting 2-5 Cav on Jan 03, '72. I infer that was a combat mission, and 
	not the "garrison duty" that they were told they had then become, which 
	is why he goes on to say that they also had to paint their MEDEVACs 
	white!
Doug says that MEDEVAC at his time was still pulling hoist 
	missions in triple canopy on the majority of the "contact" missions. He 
	says that once his first up aircraft out of Bien Hoa was interviewed by 
	both CBS and NBC news and asked how they felt about having to remove 
	their 60s, and painting their MEDEVACs white.
He says that only 
	speaking for the E.M., they did not much care for losing their 60s but 
	were outraged at having to paint their aircrafts white! He says that the 
	red crosses had presented enough of a target and that all the new S.O.P. 
	would be further endangering the lives of the wounded and crew.
	Doug also said that for him, MEDEVAC was the best duty in- country. He 
	ended his letter by saying that the only downside of his time there was 
	that they were expected to be more "stateside" due to their "stepping 
	down," which would have been the end of the 1st Cav' assignment in 
	Vietnam.
I had read about why the red crosses were retained, and the 
	later painting of the helicopters white, in the out of print G.P.O. book: 
	ARMY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN VIETNAM by Peter DORLAND and James NANNEY, 
	<HTTP: d ustoff> in the section titled: "Enemy Fire," which I include 
	below:
"Although pilot error and mechanical failure accounted for 
	more aircraft and crew losses in Vietnam than enemy fire, the air 
	ambulance pilots worried more about the latter danger than the other more 
	controllable ones. Once the buildup got under way in 1965, any air 
	ambulance pilot who served a full, one-year tour could expect to have his 
	aircraft hit by the enemy at least once. When hoist missions became a 
	routine part of air ambulance work in late 1966, enemy fire became 
	especially dangerous. Although the pilots devised ways of reducing the 
	danger, such efforts barely kept pace with improvements in enemy weaponry 
	and marksmanship.
"Before the buildup began the pilots had little 
	more than homemade weapons to fear. In 1962 and 1963 the 57th Air 
	Ambulance Detachment suffered less from enemy fire than the nonmedical 
	helicopter units, partly because of the limited number of missions the 
	unit flew in this period. The unit's five ambulance helicopters flew a 
	total of only 2,800 hours those two years, and no pilot or crewman was 
	wounded or killed in action. To get their minimum flight time and 
	provide themselves some insurance against a lucky enemy hit, the pilots 
	started flying two ships on each mission. But once the buildup got under 
	way in late 1964 the unit went back to single ship missions, and most of 
	the division and non-divisional air ambulance units that later joined them 
	also followed this practice.
"The return to single-ship missions 
	demanded a few unorthodox procedures. International custom and the Geneva 
	Conventions, which the United States considered itself bound to observe, 
	dictated that an ambulance not carry arms or ammunition and not engage in 
	combat. But in Vietnam the frequent enemy fire at air ambulances marked 
	with red crosses made this policy unrealistic. Early in the war the crews 
	started taking along .45-caliber pistols, M14 rifles, and sometimes M79 
	grenade launchers. The ground crews installed extra armor plating on 
	the backs and sides of the pilots' seats. The hoist missions, introduced 
	in the late fall of 1966, produced a high rate of aircraft losses and 
	crewmember casualties.  Although at this stage of the war gunship escorts 
	for air ambulance missions were still hard to arrange, only the Air 
	Ambulance Platoon of the 1st Cavalry responded to the new danger by 
	putting machine guns on their aircraft. At first the unit simply 
	suspended two M60's on straps from the roof over the cargo doors. Later 
	they installed fixed mechanical mountings for the guns. A platoon 
	aircraft also usually carried a gunner as a fifth crewmember to handle 
	one of the M60's. Later in the war many of the air ambulance units, both 
	divisional and non-divisional, tried to arrange gunship escorts, 
	especially for hoist missions, to pickup zones that had been called in 
	as insecure. Throughout the war, however, such escorts proved hard to 
	obtain, because aeromedical evacuation was always a secondary mission for 
	a gunship in a combat zone.
"None of these defensive measures reduced 
	the rate of air ambulance losses in the war; they only prevented it from 
	approaching a prohibitive level. Most of the Viet Cong and North 
	Vietnamese soldiers clearly considered the air ambulances just another 
	target. A Viet Cong document captured in early 1964 describing U.S. 
	helicopters read: "The type used to transport commanders or casualties 
	looks like a ladle. Lead this type aircraft I times its length when in 
	flight. It is good to fire at the engine section when it is hovering or 
	landing." Fortunately Viet Cong weapons early in the war made a 
	helicopter kill virtually impossible. Late in 1964, however, the North 
	Vietnamese began to supply the Viet Cong with large amounts of 
	sophisticated firearms: Chinese Communist copies of the Soviet AK47 
	assault rifle, the SKS semiautomatic carbine, and the RPD light machine 
	gun. The introduction of these new enemy weapons in 1965-66 and of the 
	hoist missions in late 1966 caused a dramatic increase in 1967 in the 
	rate of enemy hits on air ambulances. Only in April 1972, however, when 
	the United States was well along in turning the war over to the South 
	Vietnamese, did the air ambulance have to contend with the Soviet SA-7 
	heat-seeking missile. This antiaircraft device was about five feet long, 
	weighed thirty-three pounds, and had a range of almost six miles. A pilot 
	had little warning of the missile's approach other than a quick glimpse 
	of its white vapor trail just before it separated the tail boom from his 
	aircraft. This weapon downed several air ambulances in the last year of 
	U.S. participation in the war.
"The missile also disrupted the 
	most elaborate effort the Army made during the war to reduce the losses 
	of air ambulances: a change of their color. The 1949 Geneva 
	Conventions did not require that air ambulances be painted white, and for 
	their first nine years in Vietnam the Army's air ambulances were the 
	standard olive drab, medically marked only by red crosses on small white 
	background squares. Early in the war many of the pilots thought that the 
	crosses improved the enemy's aim at their ships, and the unit 
	commanders had to resist pressure to remove the markings. Arguing that 
	they would be unable to keep aircraft that looked like transports 
	dedicated to a medical mission, the commanders prevailed, and the red 
	crosses remained for the rest of the war.
"By mid-1971, however, 
	the high loss rate for air ambulances over the last six years produced 
	much doubt about the olive drab color scheme. Believing that making the 
	aircraft more distinctive might be the answer, the Army Medical Command 
	in Vietnam secured approval in August to paint some of its aircraft 
	white. The Command also was allowed to try to persuade the enemy that the 
	white helicopters were for medical use only and should not be fired on. 
	Thousands of posters were to be distributed and millions of leaflets 
	dropped over enemy-held territory. The most elaborate leaflet read: 
	 'Some new medical helicopters not only have Red Cross markings on all 
	sides but they also are painted white instead of green. This is to help 
	you recognize them better than before in order to give the wounded a 
	better chance to get fast medical help. Like all other medical 
	helicopters, these new white helicopters are not armed, do not carry 
	ammunition, and their only mission is to save endangered lives without 
	distinction as to civilians or soldiers, friend or foe. 'MEDICAL 
	HELICOPTERS ARE USED FOR RESCUE MISSIONS AND THEY ARE NOT ENGAGED IN 
	COMBAT. YOU SHOULD NOT FIRE AT THEM.'
"An enemy soldier still intent 
	on bringing down any U.S. helicopter would now find the white helicopters 
	excellent targets against a background of forests, hills, or mountains. 
	All armaments now had to be removed from the ambulances, and gunship 
	escorts could no longer furnish close support. Unless the information 
	campaign were successful, the air ambulances would encounter more rather 
	than less resistance. But the risk, while undeniable, seemed justifiable 
	in view of combat loss statistics: from January 1970 through April 1971 
	the air ambulance combat loss rate was about 2.5 times as great as 
	that for all Army helicopters. Something had to be done.
"The test 
	program for white helicopters, begun on 1 October 1971, soon produced 
	encouraging preliminary results. In November the Army medical command 
	received permission to paint all of its remaining fifty air ambulances 
	white. However, the drawdown of U.S. forces was now in full swing. The 
	test, which terminated the following April, had begun too late in the 
	conflict and with too few helicopters to produce conclusive results. The 
	white helicopters at least had not proven any more dangerous than those 
	painted olive drab. On 28 April 1972 the MACV Surgeon recommended to the 
	Surgeon General that white helicopters continue to be used for medical 
	evacuation by the dwindling number of Army units in Vietnam.
"But 
	in the same month the enemy's introduction of the heat- seeking SA7 
	missile to South Vietnam put Army medical planners in a new quandary. To 
	navigate properly, most air ambulance pilots could not fly to and from a 
	pickup zone at altitudes low enough to enable the enemy on the ground to 
	discern the white color and the red crosses. Except at the pickup zone, 
	the white ambulances were as vulnerable as any other Army olive drab 
	aircraft. Between 1 July 1972 and 8 January 1973 the enemy fired eight 
	heat-seeking missiles at white air ambulances. The only protection 
	against the SA7 was a new paint that reflected little of the engine's 
	infrared radiation but dried to a dull charcoal green. In January 1973 
	USARV/MACV Support Command directed that all U.S. Army air ambulances in 
	Vietnam be painted with the new protective paint. Research began on a 
	white protective paint, but before any significant progress could be made 
	the war ended."
I never thought that I would hear from a MEDEVAC 
	veteran of the "last shift" like Doug CAMPBELL, but that shows who is 
	out there and paying attention, as well as interested enough to reply. 
	Unlike some, I will try to publish anything pertinent that you send in to 
	me, but like Doug, you have to send it, which includes e-mailing it to 
	me. If you have an interest to publish your stories of your experiences, 
	send them to me, if you do not, they will never get read by those 1st 
	Cav veterans who are interested.
Another veteran who has shown that 
	interest along with his long, notable Army career is James M. MCDONALD, 
	MEDEVAC PSG '70-'71, who wrote the following story: "When was the last 
	MEDEVAC Mission?"
"Although 26 March 1971 officially marked the end 
	of duties in Vietnam for the 1st Cavalry Division, President Nixon's 
	program of "Vietnamization" required the continued presence of a strong 
	U.S. fighting force. The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment, 1st Battalion 
	of the 7th Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the 8th Regiment and 1st Battalion 
	of the 12th Regiment along with specialized support units as "F" Troop, 
	9th Cavalry and Delta Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion helped 
	establish the 3rd Brigade headquarters at Bien Hoa. Its primary mission 
	was to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes in War Zone D. 
	 "The 3rd Brigade was well equipped with helicopters from the 229th 
	Assault Helicopter Battalion and later, a battery of "BLUE MAX," aerial 
	field units and two air cavalry troops.  A QRF (Quick Reaction Force) 
	-known as "Blue Platoons," was maintained in support of any air assault 
	action. The "Blues" traveled light, fought hard and had three primary 
	missions; 1) to form a "field force" around any helicopter downed by 
	enemy fire or mechanical failure; 2) to give quick backup to Ranger 
	Patrols who made enemy contact; and 3) to search for enemy trails, caches 
	and bunker complexes.
"BLUE MAX," "F" Battery, 79th Aerial Rocket 
	Artillery, was another familiar aerial artillery unit. Greatly 
	appreciated by troopers of the 1st Cavalry, its heavily armed Cobras flew 
	a variety of fire missions in support of the operations of the 3rd 
	Brigade. The pilots of "BLUE MAX" were among the most experienced combat 
	fliers in the Vietnam War. Many had volunteered for the extra duty to 
	cover the extended stay of the 1st Cavalry Division.
"On 30 March 
	1972, General GIAP of the North Vietnamese Army began an offensive across 
	the DMZ in a final attempt to unify the North and South. By 03 April, 
	these thrusts became a full scale attack. More than 48,000 NVA and VC 
	troops hit Loc Ninh. Two days later, on 05 April, the North Vietnamese 
	threw heavy assaults against An Loc and announced that by 20 April, An 
	Loc would be the new capital of the South for the North Vietnamese. 
	 "In April and May, stepped up bombings by B-52's helped blunt the 
	North Vietnamese invasion. Large groups of enemy soldiers were caught in 
	the open fields and entire NVA units were destroyed. Helicopters and 
	gunships from the 3rd Brigade saw heavy action at An Loc and Loc Ninh, 
	engaging heavy armor as well as ground troops. The intensity of the 
	fighting took a heavy toll on them. For example, on 12 May, five Cobra 
	Ships were destroyed in less than 30 minutes by Chinese Surface-to- 
	Air (SA-7) Missiles.
"On 15 May, relief units, moving down Highway 
	13, broke through and helped lift the bitter siege of An Loc. The North 
	Vietnamese were reeling from huge losses and began to withdraw to their 
	sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Their spring offensive aimed at cutting 
	South Vietnam in half and capturing Saigon had been decisively smashed. 
	The helo air effort of the 3rd Brigade had turned in a magnificent 
	performance in support of the remaining advisors with the ARVN units. 
	During the period of 05 April through 15 May 1972, more than 100 T54 
	tanks, armored personnel carriers and anti-aircraft guns were knocked out 
	in the area around An Loc.
"By 31 March 1972, only 96,000 U.S. 
	troops were involved in the Vietnam combat operations. In less than two 
	months later, the last of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 3rd Brigade, 
	began its "Stand Down" in a phased withdrawal and was bought back to 
	the United States, completing the division recall on 26 June 1972, which 
	had started over a year earlier on 05 May 1971. The 1st Cavalry Division 
	had been the first army division to go to Vietnam and the last to leave. 
	I want to find out when was the "LAST MEDEVAC MISSION FLOWN IN RVN"?
	 Always remembering our 1st Cav troops on duty around the world; over 
	and out.
	FIRST TEAM!
Garryowen,
Mike 
	Bodnar C 2\7 '69
MEDEVAC 1-7\70
SO THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE